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Assessment in education is a recent phenomenon. Although there were counterparts in former 
epochs, the term assessment only began to be spoken about in education after the second world 
war; and since that time, the views, strategies and concerns over assessment have proliferated 
according to an uncomfortable dynamic. We fear that increasingly, education is assessment-led 
rather than learning-led and ‘counter to what is desired’ in an ugly judgemental spirit whose 
moral underpinnings deserve scrutiny. In this article, we seek to historicize assessment and the 
anxieties of credentializing students. Through this longer history, we present a philosophy of 
assessment which underlies the development of a new method in assessment-as-learning. We 
hope that our development of a conversation simulator helps restore the innocence of education 
as learning-led while still delivering on the incumbencies of assessment. 
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The language of assessment  
As a term, assessment is difficult to define (Joughin, 2009); its meanings, purposes and 
motivations can be even more difficult to discover (Boud, 2000; Dawson et al., 2013). For clarity 
and inclusivity we have used Joughin’s minimalist definition of assessment in our philological 
investigation: 
To assess is to make judgements about students’ work, inferring from this what they have the 
capacity to do in the assessed domain, and thus what they know, value, or are capable of doing 
(Joughin, 2009, p. 16) 
Joughin’s definition is broad and enlightened; it represents recent thinking about what 
assessment is and what it could be. In this article we explore what assessment was through the 
history of assessment, with a focus on language. We find etymologies more aligned with taxation 
and torture than modern assessment practices, but also find the term assessment to offer 
opportunities as a relatively new word in this context. We conclude by proposing a scalable 
electronic return to Socratic dialogue. 
The newness of assessment as a term in education is not just a linguistic accident. In many 
languages, we struggle to find a word for assessment. If we look in ancient Greek, for example—
that language that gives us words like school, academy, gymnasium, pedagogy, method, syllabus 
and system—we find no obvious equivalent to assessment. A Greek might speak of an 
examination (εξέτασις) but this was applied to legal (Demosthenes 18.246) or academic inquiry 
(Plato, Apology 22e, Theaetetus 210c, Philebus 55c) rather than educational outcomes; and in 
Aristotle, an examiner, by this word, is an auditor of public accounts (Politics 1322b11). One 
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might describe an investigation through the term, but this was the scholarly activity itself, not the 
evaluation of someone’s performance at a learning activity. 
We have an adorable portrait of educational practice in ancient Greece in the dialogues of Plato. 
They represent Socrates talking to informal students who are keen to learn. It is never a process 
that ends with a discrete phase of assessment, though it could be held that it inherently assesses 
the higher virtues of discourse, as Socrates quizzes the fledgling philosophers to establish their 
analytical thinking. In their purpose, however, the point of the dialogues has nothing to do with 
assessing the neophytes. Throughout the dialogues, the interchange between the participants and 
master is to advance thinking rather than necessarily to establish the expertise of the student. 
Learning in the ancient world, and in contemporary Indigenous cultures par excellence, was 
extensively informal. A potter apprenticed to a master was quite likely destined to become a 
master, but not on the basis of an exam. In Japanese ceramic tradition, students who have the 
privilege of studying with a great master will measure their success not by how quickly they can 
get through the prescribed activities but the reverse: how long they are accepted in the master’s 
studio. 
We do not know if there was assessment in ancient education; because philology does not tell us 
that something never happened just because it was not spoken about. Certainly, a boy had to 
qualify in some way to become an ephebe, for which the verb was to assay or test (δοκιµαζω, 
Aristophanes, Wasps 578; cf. Demosthenes 27.5); and a papyrus in London from the late Roman 
period does refer to the testing of recruits using this word (Greek papyri in the BM 3.982.6; cf. 
2.338.24 from the second century using εξέτασις). But none of this conjures up an image of 
exam papers; it is more like the sporting trials (athletae probatio) in ancient Rome (Cicero, De 
officiis 1, 40, 144). When education features in the iconography of Greek vase painting, it looks 
like learning and seems too conversational for a process resembling assessment today. In 
language, the concept of examination was not only far from the delights of learning but is 
associated with stressful situations. The very word (εξέτασις) probably derives from a stretching 
(τεινω, hence τασις or swelling under force, as with the classical columns which show bulge, 
εντασις, perhaps related to the verb for stressing τανυω), which describes the pressure that you 
apply to something if you want to know that it is genuine and authentic. 
Typically, this pressure might involve torture; for thus St Paul is to ‘be examined by scourging 
(µαστιξιν ανεταζεσθαι)’, Acts 22.24. It is hardly an educational situation; but it highlights one 
structural truth about assessment, namely that assessment is mainly for the benefit of the 
assessor, not the assessed. The same verbal root is used with Herod examining (επιζητησας) the 
guards, whom he subsequently puts to death (Acts 12.19). Examination in this context just means 
being tried or judged; indeed, in other places, the very torment that Paul is threatened with is 
about ‘judging me (ανακριναντες µε)’, which occurred without Paul needing to be flogged (Acts 
28.18).  
Assessment as trial and trying 
These stressful examinations are commonplace throughout western literature, where being 
examined may involve pain—on the assumption that greater truth can be extracted in a 
circumstance of exaggerated physical stress—and may also have fatal consequences. 
Examination is close to trial, which is a word by which we describe rigorous method in clinical 
and social science as well as law. When a person is tried in court, anxieties rise, because the 
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outcome may be grave: the person tries to defend himself or herself but is tried by another person 
or several on behalf of a state institution. The aim of a trial is to sift the truth from false 
impressions; and indeed the origins of the word trial are technical, relating to sifting, perhaps 
grinding and threshing (Oxford English Dictionary). 
In common language, the idea of trying (try, try, try again) is a great mantra of encouragement. 
To get students to try, we build up their self-esteem and confidence and see the enterprise as 
affirming and reinforcing. But what is the next step that we ask them to do with their trying? It is 
to be tried, and all too often with catastrophic educational results (Boud, 1995, p. 43). The 
origins of this word are also on the gruelling side, as in Dryden’s translation of Virgil’s 
Georgics: ‘To repair his strength he tries: / hardning his limbs with painful exercise’ (3.107). To 
try, as in try on a shoe, is to see if something fits. It presupposes a template or a standard against 
which another item or person is measured. When I try something, either I or the something is, in 
a sense, on trial. 
It is also no accident that to try in French (essayer) is also a genre of assessment as well as a 
literary or philosophical genre (essai). In writing a shorter disquisition or essay, one attempts or 
tries to broach a theme; but as this essay is itself measured by somebody’s prior knowledge of 
the theme, the try is submitted to judgement. So again, the uncanny reflexiveness of assessment 
is installed in language: while you try, you are yourself being tried. Already the Greek word for 
trying (πειραζω) is both about trying and being tested, and from the earliest period of the epic 
(Odyssey 16.319, 23.114). And as if fulfilling this logical reflexiveness, St Paul exhorts: 
‘Examine yourselves (εαυτους πειραζετε), whether ye be in the faith; prove your own selves 
(εαυτους δοκιµαζετε)’, which is effectively self-assessment (2 Corinthians 13.5). 
Origins of examination 
The Roman view of examination (examen, later the more abstract examinatio) is technical and 
weak, with very limited currency in Latin, where the idea did not transfer to education. The 
origins of the word are technical, relating to the beam of a balance or scale and inherently 
embody the concept of a standard and a metric. In English, the word was used in an educational 
context, meaning something like an exam, only since the seventeenth century (Oxford English 
Dictionary). Instances of the Latin root in the Romance derivatives during the renaissance and 
baroque are rare and also—at least in our reading so far—not educational. For example, Littré 
finds the first use of examen as an educational exam only in the twentieth century. 
Meanwhile, several words were used in Latin to describe the sometimes painful interrogation of 
suspects, especially inquisition (quaestio) which is paradoxically the origin of our innocent word 
question but which is exceedingly unpleasant in the history of the Mediterranean, culminating in 
the persecution of heretics from the middle ages to the seventeenth century. As in Greek, the 
more innocent words around the concept of examination (like scrutinium) apply to what we 
would call research rather than education. 
In a contemporary educational context, the word examination evokes ranks of school children or 
undergraduate students completing a paper in strictly invigilated circumstances, with a dire hush 
and disciplinary action taken for breaches of isolation from assistance in the form of contraband 
notes. The atmosphere is aligned with the etymology; the collective linguistic history of the 
words in even as simple a phrase as “there will be an essay question in the exam” conjures up 
torture, trial and inquisition. Typically, the examination terminates a period of study and is taken 
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as proof of a student’s grasp of the syllabus. Though the study leading up to the examination may 
or may not yield long-term learning, the examination itself is not a learning experience but is 
solely conceived as proof of learning having taken place. 
Origins of the test and testing 
Insofar as exams are somewhat traumatic for the student, they seemed, at various times, to suit 
the purpose. In the European psyche, the way to credentialize anything is to subject it to stress. A 
metal, for example, might be proven to be whole or elementally irreducible by being tested under 
flame; and the vessel for this proof—an earthen pot or cupel (testum)—is the late Latin origin for 
our word ‘test’. One contemporary argument for examinations is that they provide an 
environment where plagiarism is less possible (Carless, 2009); or to use ancient metaphor, the 
work is elementally irreducibly the student’s own. 
A test is close in meaning and sound to testimony and the academic testamur (we attest); but the 
semantic and phonological similarities are a coincidence. The words do not have a common 
origin. Testimony derives from the independent concept of a witness (testis). It would be 
attractive and convenient to Joughin’s (2009) definition to believe that the educational testing 
process derived from bearing witness to an achievement; but in fact the origin is more technical 
and telling: the proof in question is fierce, gruelling and somehow metallurgical, which our 
Greek word already indicated (Xenophon, Oeconomicus 20.14). 
Before contemplating the recent history of assessment, which is so much about proving things, 
we might examine one final way that language reveals the fateful alignment of experience, 
testing and proof. The three concepts are effectively bundled up in one Latin verb to test 
(probare) which is echoed in derivatives in Romance languages. To try, to taste, and even to 
experience: these words are united with the concept to prove. Proof has its origins in probare; 
and the Latin word did not lose this connotation in modern languages, as in the stressful terms of 
judging a murder (Boccaccio, provato alla corte, Decameron 3.7) in the fourteenth century. 
From the beginning of the renaissance, it can be used poetically as evidence, as with ‘a more 
certain proof (piú certa prova, Petrarch, Canzoniere 119.16–19)’ or ultimate proof (136.8); but it 
can also be used to express the idea of a challenge, as when the poet says to the personification 
of Love that he has to beat a new and marvellous prova (270.1–4). In the same century, the 
curious nun in Boccaccio who has an inkling that copulation must be the most amazing 
experience in the world formulates a plan to fornicate with the gardener Masetto in order to test 
if it really is so good (provare se così è, Decameron 3.1). With a liberal spirit shared by the 
author, the other nuns have equal interest to check out what kind of an animal a man may be 
(provare che bestia fosse l'uomo); each wanted to try (provar volle) in turn how Masetto knew 
how to mount, trying and trying again that sweetness (provando e riprovando quella dolcezza), a 
phrase that comes up in the next story as well. 
The meaning of the same word shades off into experience in general, as with Guicciardini’s 
awareness of honour which, he says ‘I have experienced in myself (provato in me medesimo, 
Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi 118). Only with difficulty could the phrase be translated as 
‘proving it in myself’. In such cases, which are also evident in French (La Bruyère, Charactères 
2.1, 2.54, 6.9, 10.51), the conception is more related to experience. It makes us wonder about the 
close link between experience and proof, given that we generally believe something to be true 
and proven if we experience it. On the one hand, it is as if they are the same thing, a great 
empirical gridlock—remembering that the word empirical also has the Greek word ‘to try’ 
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locked up inside it—; but on the other hand, the closeness of the conceptions is much to be 
emulated in education, if the proof can be close to an authentic experience, as opposed to a rule 
or an abstract proposition learned by rote. So although we can interpret these ancient linguistic 
obscurities as harbingers of educational obscurities, we can also perceive a necessary alignment 
with how we see education and assessment at their best, according to constructivist methodology 
where experience, or the first-handedness of knowledge, is privileged over instructional 
passivity, subsequently assessed with an authoritarian monitored process. 
Nevertheless, experience and proof are not identical; and the seventeenth-century author La 
Rochefoucault cautions about the fondness with which we accept verities when they belong to 
our own conspectus: ‘what often prevents us from judging analyses that prove the falsity of 
virtues is that we believe too easily that they are genuine in ourselves’ (Maximes 7); and ‘nothing 
proves better that death is redoubtable than the pains that philosophers go to in order to persuade 
us that we ought to despise it’ (12). But for much French literature in the baroque, the words 
(prouver, éprouver, preuver, differences which La Bruyère puts down to merely orthographic 
convention, Charactères 15.73) are used for the idea of moral test, as in Racine: ‘I will make a 
final proof of my courage’ (Bérénice 5.6, cf. Mithridate 4.4, Alexandre 1.2, 5.2) which must be 
uttered with grim relish. 
The structural role of anxiety 
English separates these ideas with distinct words, though there is still overlap and some logical 
continuity, given that proof is often experienced as an ordeal, a test of a scary kind as well as a 
kind of assessment in its own right. The linguistic history reveals a degree of confusion that 
inheres in the concept of assessment, which is both objective and anxious. One might add that in 
any case, assessment is somewhat equivocal in that one examines a person on the basis of what 
he or she says or does; one examines someone on something (τινα περι τινος) as Plato says 
(Phaedrus 258d) rather than directly examining the something, which would make it research. 
Assessment is not research but a ritual, which can already be established by the sociology of 
examinations. 
Perhaps in reaction to the regimented disciplinarian air of examinations, with their stomach-
withering dread of a mental-blank, educational culture has developed the nicer term of 
assessment. It is not exactly a euphemism but is gratefully image-free, somewhat clinical and 
abstract, without connotations of students marching in file to sit at small desks for three sweaty 
hours, with mean guards pacing up and down the aisles. But nor is it too soft either. Indeed the 
history of the word also has a certain judgmental gravity about it. Before it first came to be used 
in an educational context in the 1950s, assessment was long used in the evaluation of tax, a usage 
familiar to us still today with its link to penalties and temptations to cheat. The etymology is the 
verb to sit (sedere). In order to establish if goods, land or services should be subject to tax, a 
notary or minister must sit in judgement. Acting out this archaic motif, when we assess students, 
we ultimately bring the marks to a Board of Examiners or similar, where they are received with 
certain deliberations by people who sit on the board. 
The 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, of which the online version dates from 2010, 
still gives little recognition to the educational uses of the noun assessment. It features in one of 
five categories, as a subset of ‘estimation, evaluation’; but as for the verb ‘to assess’, not even 
one educational usage is cited. In English before the second world war, assessment is not a very 
common word. We do not see any form of the word in Shakespeare, for example, perhaps 
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because the bard does not use the vocabulary of taxation. But if we check out the post-war period 
and we look to the great dictionary of the internet, the word assess achieves a Google search of 
157 million pages; with many focused on educational uses of the term (July 2012). The noun 
assessment gets 83 million, and Google’s suggestion of ‘assessment for learning’ yields almost 
19 million hits.  
Modern educational uses of the term assessment in the scholarly literature are almost entirely 
post-war; articles in ERIC do not use the term in titles before 1959, and much of the early 
literature is dominated by the assessment of teaching; this may be the source of Northern 
American meanings of assessment as a synonym for the evaluation of educational methods or 
systems, rather than assessment of and for the individual. The term is used around 20,000 times 
in Google Scholar before 1945, however the uses most compatible with Joughin’s definition 
relate to psychometric and physical testing. 
 
Coming from an asymptote approaching zero, the growth in assessment is exponential and we 
now appear to be in a global epidemic of assessment language. 
Etymology guides purpose? 
Assessment in the contemporary academy performs a variety of purposes that extend it beyond 
the scope of the term ‘evaluation’. Assessment is at once a summative credentializing, as well as 
a formative guide towards learning; assessment is focused on an immediate task, as well as 
inculcating the values of a field of study. Boud (2000) describes this simultaneity as ‘double 
duty’. To view the terms ‘assessment’ and ‘evaluation’ as synonymous is to lose assessment’s 
other purposes. Some purposes, roles or goals of assessment are stated explicitly, others assumed 
or unstated. Of the myriad purposes that assessment holds, which are encapsulated in the history 
of the language of assessment? 
We have historicized the language of assessment, and its history may be connected to 
unenlightened default assumptions about the purposes of assessment. Notions of a rigorous 
stressful challenge with a goal of attainment have philological foundation. It would appear that 
modern notions of assessment privileging learning have less of a foundation in history; 
interestingly when university policywriters attempt to define assessment, they are more similar to 
the ancient than the modern (Boud, 2007). Perhaps the linguistic baggage of terms like 
assessment, essay, test, try, exam and prove might be what is clouding our thinking about what 
assessment could be, and keeping policywriters attached to what it was. 
Reclaiming the language: Assessment as learning 
Is it doing us any good? As noted, all processes of testing and examination are about proof and, 
in being put to the point, one could be proved awfully lacking. Assessment and anxiety go 
together. We remember the palpitations of being examined when we were students and 
academics remain scarred by the experience, as Boud notes: ‘even successful, able and 
committed students—those who become university teachers—have been hurt by their 
experiences of assessment, time and time again, through school and through higher education’ 
(Boud, 1995, p. 35). 
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In recent times, academics have also expressed their anxieties about pressures on research 
performance forcing teachers to make odious efficiencies in their assessment.  This fear is so 
strong that it has moved one university executive to voice scruples that the student experience is 
imperiled by the Muliple Choice Question (MCQ) method (Bailes, 2012). Indeed, to determine 
the method of assessment on the basis of expedience offends all educational principle; but there 
are grounds for heeding the pessimism. The advent of the Learning Management System (LMS) 
has made MCQs efficient and readily available to an unprecedented degree; and the ubiquity of 
LMSs presages a boom in automated assessment, which seamlessly enters marks in a gradebook 
and saves hours of work for academics.  There is no need to read anything, nor even to tally the 
marks, because the computer calculates them infallibly. 
Concerns have been expressed for the quality of the educational process as well as student 
experience. If assessment defines the actual curriculum (Ramsden, 1992), then curricula built 
around MCQ testing privilege short-term factual recall of truths and identification of falsehoods. 
The MCQ approach can even lead to learning of ‘false facts’ present in distractor options when 
feedback is not immediate (Butler & Roediger, 2008; Marsh, Roediger, Bjork, & Bjork, 2007). It 
would appear from these observations that a multiple-choice questionnaire in an LMS is an 
unlikely place in which to solve the increasing difficulties of mechanical assessment for the sake 
of the assessor rather than the student’s learning. 
This is the context in which we propose a further development in the history of assessment.  
Along with Boud (2000), we believe that assessment is inferior if it is not itself an educational 
experience.  Of course it is easy enough to establish this preference in principle; but in practice, 
the need to invent assessments that are simultaneously a learning experience adds to the 
lecturer’s stress of creating effective, accurate, undiscriminating and comprehensive assessment. 
Working toward assessment-as-learning, our innovation is to use the multiple-choice structure in 
any LMS to perform the opposite of a multiple-choice test.  We have reconfigured the MCQ 
apparatus so that it becomes the host to a Socratic dialogue of a speculative open-ended 
conversational character rather than a quiz of a finite and absolute nature. This system, which we 
call a conversation simulator, still delivers assessment but in a way that is integral with learning. 
In a conversation simulation, the computer presents the student with a situation, perhaps a 
problem which seems complicated and difficult to answer. A solution is then proposed, to which 
the student is asked either to agree, to disagree or neither to agree nor disagree: yes, no or maybe.  
Based on the choice that the student makes of these options, the computer then provides 
feedback on the wisdom of the choice and thus entertains the student in further reflexion.  These 
interactive encounters with the conversational text are (a) a learning experience with the mixture 
of narrative and argument that is proper to a tutorial and (b) assessable according to exact and 
consistent criteria with a numerical expression.  And because the conversation simulator is built 
into the LMS, it scales up effortlessly and handles any number of students. 
A conversation simulation functions according to the following sequence 
problem → proposal → decision → reflexion 
the theory of which is explained in a comprehensive open-source manual by the authors (Nelson 




Two researchers in social medicine have devised a plan to investigate the hidden milieu of 
online anorexic communities. They are extremely secretive and members on pro-anorexic sites 
are suspicious and exclude all forms of research. One of the investigators adopts a pseudonym, 
uses the language of youth and projects all the neuroses to gain acceptance. How ethical is this 
methodology? 
A response 
It sounds ugly but we have to remember that anorexia is a serious condition, akin to suicide, and 
unless we understand how it is handled, we cannot advance medical science. 
Do you agree with this response? 
No, Maybe, or Yes 
Feedback for reflexion 
The preferred answer is Maybe.  The response doesn't answer the ethical question.  It's true that 
we want to understand anorexia; but does that mean that we have to resort to deception?  The 
investigators are conducting themselves in a somewhat fraudulent spirit. 
 
(Problem posed in HED5070: Postgraduate research supervision, Graduate Certificate of 
Academic Practice, where the same problem is presented four times, on each occasion with a 
different response to search out the ethical rationale of various research methodologies.) 
 
Conversation simulations, as well as functioning as assessment, are an educational experience.  
As with Socratic dialogue, the conversations perform the teaching; if MCQs “modify the 
knowledge they are designed to assess” (Marsh et al., 2007, p. 197) then rather than attempt to 
limit this effect we embrace it. Because teaching and assessment are indivisibly folded into one 
another, there is no grey syllabus, no teaching of A, B, C and D but only assessing B. In that 
respect, assessment is anxiety-free, because the teacher has no fear of redundant syllabus. On the 
student’s side, too, there is little anxiety, because the learning activity automatically clocks up 
credit, and this process is experienced as intellectually stimulating. 
Is it possible that a kind of deus ex machina can deliver assessment from its escalating anxious 
patterns, which rehearse too many of the bad memories of history? We will not be in a position 
to know the true efficacy of the conversational simulator until it has been more broadly adopted 
(and tried, examined and tested by flame) by other educators; however, our own experience with 
this innovation leads us to cautious optimism. The computer has facilitated a stress-free neo-
Socratic encounter with ideas. In our emergent mass and massive higher education future, 
anxiety around education matters even more (Nelson & Dawson, 2012), and perhaps this or other 
methods of Socratic dialogue might help ease the anxiety. This technical discovery encourages 
us in thinking that the historically rising anxiety around assessment can be broken, by leaving its 
linguistic baggage behind. 
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